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dispose of property as he or she wishes. A person has the option to make
lifetime, or "inter vivos," gifts however they choose, or testamentary
gifts, which take effect after death and are subject to more scrutiny.' The
difference between these inter vivos gifts and probated testamentary
instruments is that the latter are formal, public documents-forever
enshrined and endorsed by the charged court. The court's significant
adjudicative act raises the issue as to the limits to which testators may go
to place conditions on their bequests in wills and trusts. 2 While it is
important to note that testators should almost always be granted deference
for their testamentary decisions, the court may be put in the position to
further discrimination when faced with enforcing the bequests within the
will. Further, the fact that beneficiaries have no inherent right or
obligation to accept these bequests 3 provides testators with the motivation
to incentivize their conveyances-sometimes in a discriminatory manner.
Therefore, the freedom to distribute one's property should be weighed
against other social values, the negative effects of dead hand control as it
relates to a particular beneficiary's freedoms, and the burdens that these
unrestricted dispositions might place on courts in interpreting and
enforcing these conditions.4
Over the last century and a half, our society has increasingly focused
on integrating groups who have been traditionally discriminated against. 5
Yet, courts have routinely upheld private, prejudicial restraints on6
bequests, most notably in the form of partial restraints on marriage.
1. An inter vivos gift is contrary to a testamentary gift, like a will or trust, which takes
effect only after a person's death. Inter Vivos Gift Law & Legal Definition, USLEGAL.COM,
http://definitions.uslegal.com/i/intervivos-gift (last visited Mar. 31, 2014); see infra Part Ill.C
(demonstrating different court evaluations regarding conditional bequests).
2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS 29(c) cmt. i. (2003) ("Although one is free to give
property to another or to withhold it, it does not follow that one may give in trust with whatever
terms or conditions one may wish to attach.").
3. See Schoonover v. Osborne, 187 N.W. 20, 20 (Iowa 1922).
It is universally presumed from the beneficial character thereof that a legatee will
accept a bequest to him if no obligation or burden is imposed upon him by reason
of such acceptance, but the rule that the legatee may reject or renounce a bequest

made for his benefit, even without casting a burden on him, is quite as universally
recognized as that of presumed acceptance.

Id.
4.

See infra Part III.

5. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (discussing the
definition of "marriage"); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (discussing the legality
of interracial marriages and rules against it as violations of Equal Protection); Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954) (discussing integration of public schools).
6. See, e.g.,
Delaware Trust Co. v. Fitzmaurice, 31 A.2d 383,389 (Del. Ch. 1943); Gordon
v. Gordon, 124 N.E.2d 228, 229 (Mass. 1955); Barnum v. Baltimore, 62 Md. 275,291 (Md. 1884);
In re Silverstein's Will, 155 N.Y.S.2d 598, 599 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1956); In re Lesser's Estate, 287
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While many of those cases were decided in the early to mid-nineteenth
century, a recent Supreme Court case, In re Estate of Feinberg,proved
that judicial enforcement has not yet caught up with our societal
progress. 7 This case necessitates the examination of the different views
as found in existing state statutes, case law, and especially in the
Restatement (Third) of Trusts and the Restatement (Second) of Property,
this largely uncodified
in order to-come up with a solution that addresses
8
States.
United
the
throughout
law
of
area
The current state of the law requires a more permanent and
comprehensive probate provision that eliminates discriminatory bequests
and can be applied consistently within states and from state to state. 9 As
will be discussed further, the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) is the most
logical and practical vehicle in which to initiate legislation that
invalidates conditions that are discriminatory in nature, serve no lawful
purpose, or are against public policy.' 0 This Note demonstrates why
conditions based on race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity,
disability, age, sexual orientation, or marital status should be deemed
unlawful testamentary restrictions and should be codified as violations
against public policy. This recommended legislation will acknowledge
that the public policy of ending discrimination and fostering tolerance
outweighs the discretion a testator has in dissolving his or her estate,
while also still preserving that intent to the extent that the conditions fall
within the scope of the public policy disfavoring prejudice.
Part 11 of this Note will discuss the social progress and public policy
in the United States over the course of the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries. This evolution of tolerance for increased diversity and
integration renders previous notions of allowing discriminatory bequests
no longer acceptable. Part III provides a summary of well-grounded
testation concepts and delves into statutes and cases that have quarreled
with the limits to testamentary freedom. Part IV introduces the specifics
of the recent controversial case, In re Estate of Feinberg.Part V explores
the Restatement (Third) of Torts and the Restatement (Second) of
Property to see how those approaches would address this discrepancy.
Finally, Parts VI and VII present novel legislation that narrowly and
directly addresses the heart of the limits on testamentary freedom
debate-the invalidation of discriminatory bequests.

N.Y.S. 209, 216 (Sur. Ct. 1936); In re Estate of Keffalas, 233 A.2d 248, 250 (Pa. 1967).
7. 919 N.E.2d 888, 903 (11. 2009); see infra Part IV.

8. These differing views and approaches will be thoroughly discussed in detail in the
following sections of this Note.
9.

10.

See infra Part V.

See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the UPC's continued influence among states).
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II. A CHANGING SOCIETY

Over the course of the last century, society in the United States has
evolved in its attitude towards people of different race, culture, and
orientation. To list a few examples, lawmakers have created laws for the
integration of schools in Brown v. Board of Education, 1 antidiscrimination laws for employment and housing in the Fair Housing Act
of 1968,12 hate crime laws providing enhanced criminal penalties for
prejudice-motivated crimes through the Hate Crime Prevention Act of
2009,13 and strengthened existing Civil Rights laws by provided for
damages to intentional employment discrimination in the Civil Rights
Act of 1991.14 Many of these decrees are taken for granted today, but it
was not long ago when practices like interracial marriages were being
challenged and even charged as crimes. 15 Recently, rulings that would
permanently ban gay marriages have been overturned. 16 Most recently,
the Los Angeles Clippers Owner, Donald Sterling, has come under fire
from fans, players, and the media for aprivaterecording containing racist
remarks. 17 The NBA has sanctioned and instituted a forced sale on this
billionaire NBA franchise owner for words and beliefs, showing our
society's outrage over blatant prejudice.' 8 This progressive attitude
embodies the unique and diverse culture that the United States was
intended to become.
There are still many more hurdles that minority groups face as they
continue to fight for the equality that they deserve. Restraints placed on
will beneficiaries are one area of law where discrimination has increased
over the last century. 19 This subject has flown under the radar in the
11. 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1968).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 249 (2009).
14. Borgna Brunner & Elissa Haney, Civil Rights Movement Timeline: Milestones in the
Modern Civil Rights Movement, INFOPLEASE.COM, http://www.infoplease.com/spot/civilrights
timelinel.html#ixzz2uSIcissl (last visited Feb. 26, 2014).
15. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2-4 (1967).
16. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013).
17. Jason Belzer, NBA Commissioner Adam Silver Bans Clippers Owner Donald Sterling
From League ForLife, FORBES MAG. (Apr. 29, 2014), availableat http://www.forbes.com/sites/
jasonbelzer/2014/04/29/nba-commissioner-adam-silver-bans-clippers-owner-donald-sterling-fr
m-league-for-life/Forbes; Jeff Zillgitt, Adam Silver gives DonaldSterling lifetime banfrom NBA,
USA TODAY, Apr. 29, 2014, availableat http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/usanow/2014/04/
29/donald-stel ing-fine-penalty-racism-audio-commissioner-adam-silver-los-angeles-suspension/
8460575/.
18. See supra note 17.
19. See, e.g., Delaware Trust Co. v. Fitzmaurice, 31 A.2d 383, 389 (Del. Ch. 1943); Gordon
v. Gordon, 124 N.E.2d 228, 229 (Mass. 1955); Turner v. Evans, 106 A. 617, 618 (Md. 1919);
Barnum v. Baltimore, 62 Md. 275, 291 (Md. 1884); In re Silverstein's Will, 155 N.Y.S.2d 598,
599 (Sur. Ct. 1956); In re Lesser's Estate, 287 N.Y.S. 209, 216 (Sur. Ct. 1936); U.S. Bank of
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struggle for equality, as other types of discrimination have been more
evident to the public eye. However, as more highlighted areas of
discrimination continually become corrected, it is important to address
discrimination in the will and trust context, where courts have allowed
prejudice to thrive.2 ° With estates and trusts, a potentially significant
amount of wealth is at stake, and by use of conditional and discriminatory
bequests, this wealth is often used to foster intolerance and create
separation. 2' The potential wealth and extent of coercion at stake,
combined with a widespread shift in public policy, requires legislatures
to create laws that permanently protect people from discrimination in the
will and trust context.
"Public policy" is often criticized as being an amorphous concept, but,
in this situation, there is an extensive track record of harms to
beneficiaries that needs to be properly addressed.22 It is defined as the
"principles and standards regarded by the legislature or by the courts as
23
being of fundamental concern to the state and the whole of society."
Public policy fluctuates with the changing economic needs, social
customs, and moral aspirations of the people. 24 It enters into and
25
influences the enactment, execution, and interpretation of legislation.
Therefore, state constitutions and statutes are largely embodiments of
common law and social values. 26 It is the governing policy within a
community as embodied in its legislative and judicial enactments, which
serve as a basis for determining what acts are to be regarded as contrary
to the public good.27 These definitions give credence to modern society's
values of equality and tolerance. The testator's intent should be fashioned
within the confines of this public policy. Public policy dictates the
creation of a narrow, but essential, exception to a testator's freedom to
condition his bequests. As a result of this identified public policy backed
by numerous bodies of law, testators should not be given the discretion
Portland v. Snodgrass, 275 P.2d 860, 864 (Or. 1954); In re Estate of Keffalas, 233 A.2d 248, 250
(Pa. 1967).

20.

See supra text accompanying note 19.

21.
22.
23.

See infra Part III.C-D.
See infra Part III.
Bolz v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 52 P.3d 898, 902 (Kan. 2002) (citing BLACK'S LAW

DICTIONARY 1245 (7th ed. 1999)).
24. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 16(c) (9th ed. 2009).
25. THE FREE DICTIONARY, Public Policy, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/
Public+Policy (last visited Feb. 27, 2014).
26. Public Policy Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/

public+policy (last visited Mar. 28, 2014) ("The fundamental policy on which laws rest, especially
policy not yet enunciated in specific rules. The principle that injury to the public good or public
order constitutes a basis for setting aside, or denying effect to, acts or transactions."). Id.
27. Public Policy Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/public%20 policy (last visited Feb. 27, 2014).
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to control their beneficiaries' actions for purposes now considered
intolerable and unlawful.
III. TENSION

BETWEEN FREEDOM OF TESTATION AND DEAD
HAND CONTROL

A. Overview
Our legal system allows the deceased to exert some control over the
living up to a certain point.2 8 The testator exercises this "dead hand
control" when he or she places conditions on the bequests to the
beneficiaries in an effort get them to act or abstain from acting in some
way. 29 Many basic rules regarding conditional bequests have held true
throughout time. Total restraints on marriage are invalid. 30 The idea
behind this rule is that a testator cannot prohibit what a beneficiary has a
right to do. However, this rule does not apply if the restraint is to the
testator's surviving spouse or if the restraint appears to be employed for
a benevolent motive.3 1 Partial restraints on marriage are valid unless the
28. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS,
TRUSTS, AND INHERITANCE LAW 125 (2009) (describing the extent and limits of dead hand
control).
29. See id. Dead hand control is the attempt made by a deceased testator to continue a
controlling influence over his beneficiaries through testamentary provisions and restrictions.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 426 (8th ed. 2004).
30. Harbin v. Judd, 340 S.W.2d 935, 937 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1960). For example, a testator
may not say, "I give all to A, so long as he never marry." However, "I leave my estate to B, so
long as she is not remarried" is permitted because the testator may not want his estate passing on
to the person that the former spouse eventually marries. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP. §
6.3 (1983).
An otherwise effective restriction in a donative transfer which is designed to
prevent the acquisition or retention of an interest in property by the transferee in
the event of the remarriage of the transferee is valid only if: (1) The transferee
was the spouse of the transferor, or (2) The restraint is reasonable under all the
circumstances.
Id.
31.

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 28, at 18.
It is not contrary to public policy for a trust provision to encourage a beneficiary
to be a productive member of society or to pursue a particular career or form of
training, as long as the effect of the provision is not punitive or so rewarding as
to be coercive. Thus, a settlor may validly create a trust or include a provision
solely to finance a beneficiary's higher education, or a particular type of
education, or to facilitate pursuit of a particular type of career (such as religious
or social service) by compensating for the financial sacrifices that tend to be
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courts deem them unreasonable. 32 Testators can only impose reasonable
conditions and this usually depends on
the sphere of eligible partners
33
available for the beneficiary to marry.
On the other hand, religious restraints are very rarely unenforceable
as against public policy. 34 Restraints that induce a beneficiary's divorce
will be held invalid, unless the court construes the inducement to be made
out of benevolence.35 For example, a testator may give $200,000 "to my
daughter in the event her husband predeceases her or in case of divorce,
so that she can support herself' because the language is presented in a
manner for the daughter's benefit, rather than inducing the husband's
death or divorce between the couple. Restrictions for a moment in time
or at the testator's death have also been upheld.36 In the religious context,
these provisions may require a third party, a rabbi or priest, for example,
to determine whether a provision in the will is being followed.37 Potential
problems may arise in this situation, especially if the recipient is being
deprived of his bequest after he has received it due to violating the
religious restraint. 38 However, courts abstain from evaluating the tenets
of a particular religion due to Constitutional reasons of excessive
associated with the career choice.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29(c) cmt. 1 (2003). "A clause that the beneficiary is to get

income only so long as he refrains from using tobacco and liquor.., is valid." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROP. § 8.2 (1983).

32.

Harbin,340 S.W.2d at 937-38.
[T]he provision was not an invalid restraint upon marriage since.., it was not
made with the intention of restraining marriage to an unreasonable degree, but
for the primary purpose of providing a home for all of the children which could
not be disturbed or broken up by the subsequent marriage ....

Id.
33. See In re Estate of Keffalas, 233 A.2d 248, 250 (Pa. 1967) (evaluating condition
requiring marriage to person of Greek and Orthodox descent); Maddox v. Maddox's Adm'r., 52
Va. (1 Gratt.) 804, 809 (1854) (declining to enforce condition requiring marriage with a Quaker);
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP. §§ 6.2 (1983).

34. See, e.g., Turner v. Evans, 106 A. 617, 618 (Md. 1919); In re Devlin's Trust Estate,
130 A. 238, 239 (Pa. 1925); Drace v. Klinedinst, 118 A. 907, 909 (Pa. 1922); Maddox, 52 Va. (1
Gratt.) at 809.
35. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32 (stating that the intent was not to forbid
marriage, but only to give the use until marriage).
36. See Cmty. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Rapaport, 213 So.2d 316, 318-19 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1968) (holding that the restraint applied to marital status at time of testator's death and did
not divest beneficiary who married, outside the Jewish faith after the testator's death).
37. See also Harbin, 340 S.W.2d at 938.
38. See also id. Courts prefer to avoid situations where they have to go back in and
repossess the part of the estate granted to the beneficiary for violating the condition after the
beneficiary received the bequest. Id. This type of condition is called a "condition subsequent." Id.
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entanglement. 39 Testamentary gifts conditioned on the beneficiary not
marrying a specified individual have been upheld.40 Some provisions
contain "gift-overs" if the first provision fails, and many courts give to
the alternative beneficiary designated in a will if the first provision is
contrary to public policy. 41 In this situation, courts should nullify the
invalid provisions if they are against public policy and just give to that
intended beneficiary.42 Doing so would express distaste for a
discriminatory provision hiding behind an alternative provision. A
majority of these cases appear to have overlap between restraints on
religion and restraints on marriage, and also contain some of the
principles stated above. 43 Along with courts, a few state legislatures have
attempted find a solution to conditional bequests.
B. Statutes
Some states have attempted to thwart conditions that tend to restrain
marriage through statutes.44 These statutes have made any conditions that
restrain marriage void, except in the case of minors. 45 These approaches
are flawed because they are both overbroad and too narrow. They are
overbroad because they do not consider the testator's intent at all in
bequeathing his estate. The statutes are also too narrow because they limit
the invalidation of the bequest to limited circumstances, such as marriage,
and do not focus on any reasons as to why the restraints should be void.
Instead, the proper balance in formulating a statute is to give adherence
39. In re Estate of Laning, 339 A.2d 520, 523 (Pa. 1975) ("[T]he bequest involved here
requires no inquiry into either doctrine or belief. All that need be determined is whether the
beneficiaries are or are not Members of the specified church."). The court followed up this
statement with a footnote justifying its position: "We construe membership 'in good standing' to
mean only formal affiliation with the specified church. Any other construction could entail inquiry
into doctrine or belief, and would thus lead to invalidity and the consequent frustration of the
testatrix's intention." Id. at 523 n.3.
40. In re Seaman's Will, 112 N.E. 576, 577 (N.Y. 1916) (Testator stated that his daughter
should be "married to some person other than one Leo Fassler who now resides in the city of New
York and is there engaged in the practice of law, or provided that at the time of my death the said
Leo Fassler is dead").
41. See In re Lesser's Estate, 287 N.Y.S. 209, 216 (Sur. Ct. 1936).
42. See N.Y. ESTATES, POWERS, AND TRUSTS LAW § 3-3:5(a) (McKinney 2013). (stating
"Conditions qualifying dispositions; conditions against contest; limitations thereon: A condition
qualifying a disposition of property is operative despite the failure of the testator to provide for
an alternative gift to take effect upon the breach or non-occurrence of such condition.").
43. See infra Part III.C.
44. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 710 (2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-6 (2013); FLA. STAT.
ANN § 736.0404 (West 2013); IND. CODE § 29-1-6-3 (2013); MICH. COMP. L. ANN. § 700.7404
(West 2013); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-706 (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-02-25 (2013); OKLA.
STAT. 15, § 220 (2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-722 (2013).
CAL. Civ. CODE § 710; GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-6; MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-706; N.D.
45.
CENT. CODE § 47-02-25; OKLA. STAT. 15, § 220.
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to a testator's intent and then carve out the necessary exceptions to it if
the condition violates a certain public policy that the state wants to protect
or further. These statutes fail to allow even partial restraints on marriages
for benevolent purposes, and they ignore the many reasons
why testators
46
place conditions on gifts in the first place-prejudice.
1. States' Insufficient Attempts at Codification
Many states have at least attempted to rectify this unregulated area of
probate law. For example, Oklahoma's and Montana's "Restraint of
Marriage" statutes offer swift resolutions in one avenue of
discrimination-marriage. They state that every condition that restrains
marriage is unlawful, except in the case of minors.47 Similarly, Indiana's
"Restraint of Marriage" prohibition states "[a] devise to a spouse with a
condition in restraint of marriage shall stand, but the condition shall be
void., 48 These probate statutes are overbroad because they invalidate all
conditions against marriage, and not just discriminatory ones. While most
conditions restraining marriage would fall under some type of religious
or other prejudicial motive, the statutes also bar any potentially
benevolent conditions, like bequests that encourage a beneficiary to get
an education or stop partaking in harmful behavior. Invalidation of these
types of bequests are unwarranted because they are made to benefit
beneficiaries in both granting them a gift and improving their
circumstances. These statutes are also too narrow because they only
consider restraints in the marriage context and not in bequests generally.
For example, if the testator were to condition a bequest disallowing a
beneficiary from associating with a person of another race or from
attending a certain religious place of worship, then the bequest would
evade the statute's scope because marriage is not implicated. The states
appear to be codifying these laws for the right to marry and not to protect
people from discrimination, which entirely undercuts the real issue in its
entirety. 49 By enacting statutes written in this way, the lawful power for
testators to condition their bequests in ways that are not discriminatory in
nature is completely erased.
Other probate statutes incorporate more exceptions that are commonly
seen in case law. For example, Georgia's statute carves out an exception
for restraints against a particular person and benevolent purposes, which
46. See infra Part III.B.1.
47. OKLA. STAT. 15, § 220. "Every contract in restraint of the marriage of any person, other
than a minor, is void." Id.; MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-706. "Contracts in restraint of marriage
generally void: Every contract in restraint of the marriage of any person other than a minor is

void." Id.
48. IND. CODE § 29-1-6-3.
49. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 29-1-6-3; MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-706; OKLA. STAT. 15, § 220.
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is acceptable under case law.5" California's and North Dakota's statutes
elaborate on the benevolent purposes exception by allowing a condition
that offers use of a bequest up until marriage. 5 1 The problems with these
statutes are that they are too limiting in their scope by enumerating the
circumstances where conditions are allowed, rather than targeting the
main problem of conditional bequests-the tendency to discriminate.
While these states are searching for a balance in allowing certain
restraints and invalidating others, other states are not properly addressing
the issue at all.52 For example, Tennessee's probate statute completely
adheres to the testator's intent and does not consider a situation in which
to disregard a bequest for discriminatory reasons. 53 Conversely, Florida,
Michigan, and Virginia have provisions similar to the Restatement
(Third) of Trusts, saying that trusts can only be created for lawful

50. GA. CODE ANN.§ 19-3-6. "Restraints of marriage: Marriage is encouraged by the law.
Every effort to restrain or discourage marriage by contract, condition, limitation, or otherwise
shall be invalid and void, provided that prohibitions against marriage to a particular person or
persons or before a certain reasonable age or other prudential provisions looking only to the
interest of the person to be benefited and not in general restraint of marriage will be allowed and
held valid." Id.
51. CAL. CIV. CODE § 710 (2013). "Conditions in restraint of marriage: Conditions
imposing restraints upon marriage, except upon the marriage of a minor, are void; but this does
not affect limitations where the intent was not to forbid marriage, but only to give the use until
marriage." Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-02-25 (2013).
Restraints upon marriage void-Use until marriage: Conditions imposing
restraints upon marriage, except upon the marriage of a minor, or of the widow
of the person by whom the condition is imposed, are void. This does not affect
limitations when the intent was not to forbid marriage but only to give the use
until marriage.
Id.
52. See, e.g., N.J STAT. ANN. 3B: 3-33.1 (2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-5-101 (2013);
TEX. ESTATES CODE ANN. § 254.001 (West 2013).
53. TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-5-101.
Full estate; grants or devises: Every grant or devise.of real estate, or any interest
therein, shall pass all the estate or interest of the grantor or devisor, unless the
intent to pass a less estate or interest shall appear by express terms, or be
necessarily implied in the terms of the instrument.
Id. But see FLA. STAT. ANN § 736.0404 (West 2013). "A trust may be created only to the extent
the purposes of the trust are lawful, not contrary to public policy, and possible to achieve. A trust
and its terms must be for the benefit of its beneficiaries." Id.; MICH. CoMP. L. ANN. § 700.7404
(West 2013) ("[a] trust may be created only to the extent its purposes are lawful, not contrary to
public policy, and possible to achieve."); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-722 (2013) (containing identical
language to the Florida trust provision).
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purposes and not contrary to public policy. 54 While this is a step in the
right direction, the provisions contain no definitions or guidelines
regarding what is lawful and what is against public policy. These terms
need to be defined in order to provide clarity and strength behind the
statute. Controversies cannot continue to be resolved variably from court
to court and from state to state due to different judges' social opinions.
So long as a uniform law is not set in place to adequately address this
issue, courts around the country will continue to reach inconsistent and,
more often than not, unjust conclusions due, in large part, to this
overhanging precedent.
2. UPC: The Best Candidate
The UPC is closest thing our country has to a widely adopted set of
probate laws. 55 However, it contains only general information regarding
the rules and requirements of testation, such as the procedures that make
wills valid and inheritance under intestate succession.56 It contains no
anti-discrimination provision with regards to bequests, and, therefore,
will be the target and vehicle of this Note's legislation. 57 As more states
adopt provisions from the UPC, 58 the more practical it becomes for the
UPC to initiate the pioneer provision and influence the states to adopt that
provision as well, rather than hope for states to individually create
identical and sufficient statutes themselves. The Uniform Law
54.

FLA. STAT. ANN § 736.0404; MICH. COMP. L. ANN. § 700.7404; VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-

722; see infra Part V.A (explaining the Restatement (Third) of Trusts's position, which has
influenced the Florida, Michigan, and Virginia statutes).
55. Eighteen states have adopted the UPC in its entirety, while many others have
incorporated parts of the code. The states that have adopted the UPC are Alaska, Arizona,
Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New
Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, U.S. Virgin Islands, Utah.
AMY MORRIS HESS, GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES § 7 (3d ed. 2007); UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, Legislative Fact Sheet- Probate

Code, http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Probate%20Code
(last
visited Feb. 26, 2014).
56. See generally UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, Uniform Probate Code (1969) (Last
Amended or Revised in 2010), availableat http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/probate%20
code/upc%202010.pdf.
57. The underlying purposes and policies of this [code] are: (1) to simplify and clarify the
law concerning the affairs of decedents, missing persons, protected persons, minors and
incapacitated persons; (2) to discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution
of his property; (3) to promote a speedy and efficient system for liquidating the estate of the
decedent and making distribution to his successors; (4) to facilitate use and enforcement of certain
trusts; (5) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § I102(b) (2012).
58. UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION,
Legislative Fact Sheet- Probate Code,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Probate%20Code (last visited Feb.
26, 2014).
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Commission (ULC) is the body that created the UPC and continues to
craft provisions. The ULC works exclusively in subject matter areas that
are appropriate for state legislation.59 The purpose of the ULC, as stated
in Article 1.2 of its Constitution is, "to promote uniformity in the law
among the several States on subjects where uniformity is desirable and
practicable." 60 One of the guidelines in deciding whether to pursue a new
proposal is to "[flill an emergent need, modernize an antiquated concept,
or codify the common law." 61 The ULA would fulfill the above criteria
by promulgating the anti-discriminatory provision and creating an
approach that properly addresses this mishandled area of law. Without
this guiding provision, states will either continue to restrict or overdo
their probate statutes or fail to even address the issue at all. Additionally,
courts, as displayed below, will continue to reach inconsistent decisions
adverse to modern-day principles of tolerance and integration.
C. Cases
Bequests are perhaps the most valued estate planning components in
American society through which testators leave behind all of their
property and life savings by will or trust. Many times, a testator will
attach a condition to a particular bequest in order to entice a beneficiary
to behave or perform in a certain way. While most conditions are
generally made with the beneficiary's "best" interests in mind, they are
oftentimes the result of the testator's own biases and prejudices. Because
of the unfortunate chance that a bequest can be conditioned for an
unlawful or prejudicial purpose, specific limits need to be instituted to
narrow the scope of a valid bequest. Discriminatory bequests can appear
in a variety of forms ranging from religious to racial, national origin to
ethnic, and age to sexual orientation, to name a few. The conditional
bequests may materialize in many potentially troubling forms:
To my son, provided he returns to be a practicing member of the
Catholic Church and raises his children in the faith.
To my son, so long as he is married to a woman at my death; if not,
then my entire estate goes to organizations in support of marriage
exclusively between men and women.
To my daughter, on condition that she never marry a Middle

59.

UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, New Project Proposals http://www.uniformlaws.org/

Narrative.aspx?title=New/o20Project%20Proposals (last visited Feb. 26, 2014).
60.

UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, Criteriafor New Projects http://www.uniformlaws.org/

Narrative.aspx?title=Criteria%20for%2ONew%/o20Projects (last visited Feb. 26, 2014).
61.

UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, New Project Proposals http://www.uniformlaws.org/

Narrative.aspx?title=New%20Project%20Proposals (last visited Feb. 26, 2014).
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62
Easterner or anyone outside of her race.

Courts have very often allowed similar types of testamentary
restrictions. 63 Reading these provisions may leave some readers
surprised-even disgusted. Some may wonder how this type of blatant
prejudice could still be enforceable in today's world, despite major
societal progresses in protections such as the Free Exercise Clause,64 the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,65 and the recent upending of the Defense of
Marriage Act.66
1. Upheld Discriminatory Bequests
Some state statutes and the occasional court ruling have provided
limited protection to these beneficiaries and groups who have been
traditionally discriminated against. 67 Still, those protections have been
either too narrow with regard to subject matter or too broad by completely
discarding a testator's intent.68 As a result, the courts have enjoyed the
62. Examples given by Author to show the different types of discriminatory restraints that
could be permitted by courts based on current precedents.
63. See, e.g., Delaware Trust Co. v. Fitzmaurice, 31 A.2d 383, 389 (Del. Ch. 1943); Gordon
v. Gordon, 124 N.E.2d 228, 229 (Mass. 1955); Barnum v. Baltimore, 62 Md. 275,291 (Md. 1884);
In re Silverstein's Will, 155 N.Y.S.2d 598, 599 (Sur. Ct. 1956); In re Lesser's Estate, 287 N.Y.S.
209, 216 (Sur. Ct. 1936); In re Estate of Keffalas, 233 A.2d 248, 250 (Pa. 1967).
64. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
65. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the most sweeping civil rights legislation since Civil
War Reconstruction. It prohibited discrimination of all kinds based on race, color, religion, or
national origin. The law also provides the federal government with the powers to enforce
desegregation. Borgna Brunner & Elissa Haney, Civil Rights Movement Timeline: Milestones in
the Modern Civil Rights Movement, INFOPLEASE.COM, http://www.infoplease.com/spot/civil
rightstimelinel.html#ixzz2uSIcissI (last visited Feb. 26, 2014).
66. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013).
DOMA instructs all federal officials, and indeed all persons with whom samesex couples interact, including their own children, that their marriage is less
worthy than the marriages of others. The federal statute is invalid, for no
legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to
injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in
personhood and dignity.
Id.
67. These statutes generally involve the prohibition against the restraint of marriage only.
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 710 (2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-6 (2013); IND. CODE § 29-1-6-3
(2013); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-706 (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-02-25 (2013); OKLA. STAT.
15, § 220 (2013). Most controversies have occurred in the religious context. See Turner v. Evans,
106 A. 617, 618 (Md. 1919); In re Devlin's Trust Estate, 130 A. 238, 239 (Pa. 1925); Drace v.
Klinedinst, 118 A. 907, 909 (Pa. 1922); Maddox v. Maddox's Adm'r., 52 Va. (1 Gratt.) 804, 804
(1854).
68. See supra text accompanying notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
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freedom to issue decisions in this controversial area of law. 69 The most
common type of discriminatory bequest involves a testator attempting to
control the type of religion a beneficiary is to practice, especially in
70
situations of choosing a spouse belonging to the testator's religion.
Courts have disagreed on whether testamentary conditions that
functioned to restrain the beneficiary's religious practices are valid. The
courts have traditionally abstained from encroaching on the testator's
attitudes in this controversial subject and have also hid behind the shield
of the bequests' "reasonableness."'', Several cases have discussed these
rationales for upholding discriminatory bequests.
In Delaware Trust Co. v. Fitzmaurice,the condition read "to Ruth M.
Ogle... so long as she lives up to and observes and follows the teachings
and faith of the Roman Catholic Church .... ,72 The beneficiary argued
that the condition served to induce fraud and hypocrisy by making
beneficiaries pretend to adhere to a certain religious belief.7 3 The court
stated that the condition was not contrary to the public policy of the state,
and the testatrix had the right to condition the gift. 74 The court went on to
say that mere inducement to adopt or to adhere to a particular religious
belief is not a denial of religious freedom. 75 The court's blunt rationale
declaring that the bequest was simply not against public policy and did
not violate the beneficiary's rights creates cause for concern. It turned a
blind eye to the testator's actions and placed the focus on the
beneficiary's right to refuse the gift, which wrongfully downplays the
significant value a gift may contain.
In Gordon v. Gordon, the court held that the will provision revoking
a gift to any child who should marry a person not born in the Jewish faith
was not so unreasonable a restraint upon marriage as to be invalid, nor
was it an unreasonable religious restriction of the future spouse's parents
at the time of her birth.7 6 This type of determination on "reasonableness"
is completely arbitrary, particularly when there are no explicit guidelines
to determine what is or is not reasonable. If one court deems a bequest to
be reasonable because of a testator's discretion to condition a gift,
especially because a beneficiary is not required to accept the gift, and
69. See infra Part III.C.
70. See id.
71. See Gordon v. Gordon, 124 N.E.2d 228, 229 (Mass. 1955); In re Silverstein's Will, 155
N.Y.S.2d 598, 599 (Sur. Ct. 1956); Harbin v. Judd, 340 S.W.2d 935, 937 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1960).
72. Delaware Trust Co. v. Fitzmaurice, 31 A.2d 383, 386 (Del. Ch. 1943).
73. Id. at 389; see also Maddox v. Maddox's Adm'r., 52 Va. (1 Gratt.) 804, 814-15 (1854)
("[The bequest] tends to corrupt the pure principles of religion, by holding out a bribe for external
profession and conformity to a particular sect. .. ").
74. Delaware Trust Co., 31 A.2d at 389.
75. Id.
76. Gordon, 124 N.E.2d at 229. The condition required the future spouse's parents to both
be Jewish as well. See id.
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another court decides that limiting a beneficiary's potential spouses to
one class of people is unreasonable, then there would be no consistency
from courtroom to courtroom. This calamitous "reasonableness test" is
precisely what courts have exercised over the last century and a half.77
Instead of continuing to allow these cases to be decided at the whims of
individual judges, it is essential for state legislatures to adopt consistent
and rational statutes that reflect our country's progress. With this type of
enacted law in place, these cases will be decided consistently (and
properly) within each state and from state to state.
Despite the obvious flaws of the reasonableness test, it is still better
than courts abdicating their functions to assure justice and equality. The
condition in Barnum v. Baltimore required the testator's brother to cease
membership in the Roman Catholic priesthood at the testator's death or
withdraw from the priesthood within 12 months thereafter.7 8 The court
concluded that there was no room to question the right of the testator to
prescribe such condition.7 9 This is an example of a court ratifying a
discriminatory bequest by opting to stay out of it. Conversely, it is even
plausible to conclude that the reasonableness would lead some judges to
invalidate this condition because inducing a priest to discontinue his call
to priesthood is unreasonable. When a court opts to stay out of a
controversy like this, one can interpret the act as endorsement of the type
of discriminatory bequest.
The reasonableness test continued to rear its ugly head in In re
Silverstein 's Will.80 There, the condition stated that "[t]he shares of my
grandchildren shall be paid to each on the date of their marriage and
provided they marry a person of Hebrew faith.",8' The court stated that
conditions in partial restraint of marriage which merely impose
82
reasonable restrictions upon marriage are not against public policy.
Professor Gareth Jones illustrated his disdain for this type of condition:
To induce or to tempt, expressly or indirectly, a human being not
to . . . marry a person of a certain race or faith is wholly
objectionable; to uphold the restraint is to endow the dead with an
unjustifiable power of intruding themselves into the most personal
aspects of human life. Moreover, to justify a restraint on the ground
that the testator's intention was not to restrain marriage but to
77. See, e.g., In re Silverstein's Will, 155 N.Y.S.2d 598, 599 (Sur. Ct. 1956); In re Estate
of Keffalas, 233 A.2d 248, 250 (Pa. 1967); Maddox, 52 Va. (I Gratt.) at 809; see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP. § 6.2 (1983).
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Barnum v. Baltimore, 62 Md. 275, 288 (Md. 1884).
Id. at 291.
155 N.Y.S.2d 598 (Sur. Ct. 1956).
Id. at 599.
Id
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provide for the support of a particular beneficiary does not make
the restraint
any less offensive if it does indeed discourage
83
marriage.
Further, the court indicated that conditions restricting marriage to a
person of a particular faith or race are not invalid.84 This statement
bludgeoned the naYve assumption that restrictions based on race would
not likely be enforced as a violation of public policy.85 As long as there
is precedent for this type of condition, society is not protected.
Considering the fact that a court recently took this stance on race, the
public cannot continue to rely on individual judges getting it right-even
despite societal pressures to the contrary.
Discriminatory restraints have also included conditions aimed at
different ethnicities. In In re Estate of Keffalas, the condition in the will
required the child to marry a person of "true Greek blood and descent and
of Orthodox religion." 86 The court did not hold the condition invalid as
against freedom of religion; rather, they tended to induce divorce from
87
the already married beneficiaries, thus violating public policy.
Consequently, the condition was invalid as applied to the already married
beneficiaries, but valid as to those beneficiaries who had not yet
married. 88
Finally, testators have added gift-over provisions following their
discriminatory restrictions to take effect if their initial discriminatory
provision is not followed. 89 These gift-over provisions are necessary to
make sure that an entire bequest does not fail because a beneficiary does
not live up to a particular condition. However, it appears that some of
these gift-over clauses are being used to back up the initial discriminatory
90
provision in case that provision is struck as void against public policy.
In In re Lesser's Estate, the bequest required children and their parents
to adhere to a Jewish upbringing, and a gift-over clause to a Jewish
charity if the first condition was not followed. 91 The court stated that it

83. GARETH H. JONEs, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts, in DEATH, TAXES AND
FAMILY PROPERTY 119, 127-28 (Halbach ed. 1977).
84. In re Silverstein's Will, 155 N.Y.S.2d at 599. This statement was made in dictum, but
may be used for precedential value in the future because of its memorialization in the opinion.
This is one of the many reasons that this issue requires legislation to thwart the potential for
statements like these to garner precedential value.
85. JONES, supra note 83, at 129.
86. In re Estate of Keffalas, 233 A.2d 248, 250 (Pa. 1967).
87. Id.
88. Id. at250-51.
89. See In re Lesser's Estate, 287 N.Y.S. 209, 210-11 (Sur. Ct. 1936).
90. Seeid. at216.
91. Id. at 210-11. The bequest named the testators children as beneficiaries,
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was not for them to question the correctness of the testator's views or
prejudices. 92 It stated that the testator's objective was to see to it that the
beneficiaries adhered at least to the outward manifestations of the
religious faith in which he believed.93 Regardless of the court's reasoning,
which seems to align with the "stay out of it" reasoning in Barnum, it is
important to take note of the underlying gift-over provision. If the court
had decided that the first clause was invalid, then the second clause,
which left everything to a charity, would be administered.94 Thus, despite
a court invalidating a discriminatory provision as against public policy,
the beneficiaries would still be left with nothing after the gift-over clause
is given effect. 95 The proper way to handle this type of situation is to
strike out the discriminatory provision and just give the bequest to the
named beneficiaries, thus ignoring the gift-over provision. This action
makes sense because the testator wanted to take care of his children and
grandchildren and could have made a separate gift to his chosen charity
if he so pleased.96 At the same time, it also disincentivizes testators from
safely tacking on these discriminatory conditions because both provisions
will be struck.
These courts' decisions to use the reasonableness test, enforce giftovers, attempt to stay out of the situation, or bluntly declare that the
conditions are not against public policy despite a dynamic societal shift
towards tolerance and equality have left beneficiaries vulnerable in
having to choose to accept a testamentary gift. Although much of the case
law has been in favor of upholding discriminatory restraints in wills and
trusts, a few courts have provided different analyses that contest this
majority.
2. Voided Discriminatory Bequests
Before discussing cases that have voided discriminatory conditional
bequests, it is essential to look at examples of conditions that are valid.

provided these children are given a normal Jewish, liberal education including
an ability to read Hebrew... and, further, provided that the Jewish dietary laws
are observed by their parents up to and including the confirmation of these my
present grandchildren ....
If these conditions are not complied with... then the
funds herein bequeathed are to go to the "Federation for the Support of Jewish
Philanthropic Societies of New York City ....
Id.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 216.
Id.
Seeid. at210-11.
See id.
See id. at 216.
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Conditional bequests should serve a lawful purpose with no prejudicial
connotations in order to be enforceable. Contrast the aforementioned
discriminatory provisions from the previous section 97 with the following:
To my son, so long as he quits using recreational drugs.
To my daughter, so long as she graduates from college within five
years of my death.
Trust income to my daughter during
the time that she is unmarried,
98
so that she can support herself.
These provisions are considered to be benevolent provisions and are
used to encourage and support beneficiaries to live in a decent way. 99 As
previously noted, what the testator considers to be a benevolent and valid
purpose can be very different from what the beneficiary considers
benevolent and valid. This divergence should be examined from the
beneficiary's position, and especially with societal implications in the
forefront. The comparisons between the two sets of testamentary
conditions in this section and in the previous section indicate that a line
needs to be drawn to limit the extent to which the law allows testators to
condition their bequests.
While a majority of cases throughout the last century have permitted
discriminatory conditions to continue, a few courts have invalidated those
same conditions as void against public policy.'00 These cases, while fewer
in number, demonstrate the changing sentiments throughout our country
with regard to tolerance. While encouraging, these state court decisions
still lack the firmness required to protect all persons in groups that have
been traditionally discriminated against across the nation.
In Drace v. Klinedinst, the condition was a devise to a testator's son
for his life, and then to his children, provided they remained faithful to a
particular religion; if they did not, then to the remaining children of the
testator's son who remained true to the religion.' 0 ' The court held that the
condition was void as against public policy, and the children of testator's

97. See supra text accompanying note 63.
98. Examples given by Author to show the different types of discriminatory restraints that
could be permitted by courts based on current precedents.
99. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29(c) cmt. i (2003) (discussing the legality of
a testator's conditioned bequest when it is made out of good will and in the best interest of the
beneficiary); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP. DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.2 (1983) (discussing
the legality of a testator's conditioned bequest when it is made to encourage the beneficiary to

refrain from doing acts adverse to his or her health).
100. See, e.g., Turner v. Evans, 106 A. 617, 618 (Md. 1919); In re Devlin's Trust Estate,
130 A. 238,239 (Pa. 1925); Drace v. Klinedinst, 118 A. 907,909 (Pa. 1922); Maddox v. Maddox's
Adm'r, 52 Va. (I Gratt.) 804, 809 (1854).
101. Drace, 118 A. at 908.
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son took an absolute fee. 0 2 The court artfully articulated the harsh results
if they were to uphold the bequest: "[T]he worship of God according to a
given religious persuasion could be controlled and compelled indefinitely
through the disposition of property at death. It would be a step backward,
looking to the days of religious persecution, and it is our duty to stop this
effort in its inception."' 1 3 Drace was one of the first decisions to go
against the flow of allowing religious conditions in wills. The court also
did not want to enforce the condition due to excessive entanglement
between state and religion. 10 4 Further, the court completely ignored the
gift-over provision to the children "who remain[ed] true to th[is]
religion."' 1 5 Instead, it invalidated the discriminatory condition and
named all of the children equally as the remainder recipients of the estate,
regardless of whether they adhered to the particular religion.' 0 6 The
Dracecourt provides the perfect example of the way courts should handle
the issue of discriminatory conditions, especially those with alternative
gift-over provisions.
Courts often submit to a testator's conditions if they are for a
perceived, benevolent purpose. 10 7 However, in In re Devlin's Trust
Estate, the court decided against this inclination. 10 8 There, the trust was
for the "education, maintenance and support of my grandson... only so
long as he is brought up and reared in the Roman Catholic faith."' 1 9 The
court held that the provision would bar the exercise of religious freedom,
and, despite the supposed benevolent motive of the grandfather, the
condition was invalid. 10 While other courts have stated that these types
of conditions do not interfere with a beneficiary's religious freedom,"'I
this court found otherwise." 2 These conditions do interfere with a
beneficiary's religious freedom, because the beneficiary is being coerced
to choose a religion in which he or she might not otherwise prefer to be
involved.
An early court decision tackled an inducing religious restraint directly.
In Maddox v. Maddox's Adm 'r,a member of the Society of Friends, also
known as "Quakers," willed property to his niece "during her single life,
102.

Id. at 909.

103.

Id.

104.

Id.

105.

Id. at 908. See also In re Lesser's Estate, 287 N.Y.S. 209, 210-11 (Sur. Ct. 1936)

(discussing use and invalidation of gift-over provisions).
106.

Drace, 118 A. at 909.

107.
108.
109.

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 28, at 18.
In re Devlin's Trust Estate, 130 A. 238, 239 (Pa. 1925).
Id.

110.

Id.

111. See Delaware Trust Co. v. Fitzmaurice, 31 A.2d 383, 389 (Del. Ch. 1943); In re Estate
of Keffalas, 233 A.2d 248, 250 (Pa. 1967).
112. In re Devlin's Trust Estate, 130 A. at 239.
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and forever if her conduct should be orderly, and she remain a member
of the Society of Friends." 1 13 She married a man who was not a member
of that society, and, therefore, was expelled from membership of the
society." 4 The restriction imposed by the condition would have operated
as a virtual prohibition of her marrying anyone because of the limited
number of marriageable partners available to her." l5 She could not be
expected to "go abroad" in search of a partner or to be subjected to the
chance of being sought after by a stranger. 116 The court stated that:
the terms of a bequest, requiring as the condition of its enjoyment,
that the legatee should be a member of any religious sect or
denomination, as directly violative of this policy, and pregnant
with evil consequences. It holds out a premium to fraud, meanness
and hypocrisy; it tends to corrupt the pure principles of religion,
by holding out a bribe for external profession and conformity to a
particular sect; and however pure and honest the motives of the
beneficiary may be, he is yet rendered an object of distrust and
suspicion .... 117
The court viewed this restraint as unreasonable because of the
unusually limited number of available partners." 8 While the
reasonableness test worked in this extreme situation, it has not proven
favorable to beneficiaries in most other cases, where courts have used it
to uphold similar bequests. 19 However, this court looked further than the
permissible sphere of eligible partners. The court explicitly comments on
the acts of bribing someone to be part of a certain religion as a violation
against public policy. 2 ° It is interesting to note that this court decision
took place prior to the twentieth century, whereas many courts that
followed it late into the twentieth century did not have such a progressive
attitude when society was dynamically changing. 12 1 This phenomenon
113. Maddox v. Maddox's Adm'r, 52 Va. (1 Gratt.) 804, 805 (1854).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 809. That limited number of marriageable partners was six.
116. Id.
117. Id. at814-15.
118. Id. at809.
119. See Gordon v. Gordon, 124 N.E.2d 228, 233-34 (Mass. 1955); In re Silverstein's Will,
155 N.Y.S.2d 598, 599-600 (Sur. Ct. 1956); Harbin v. Judd, 340 S.W.2d 935, 937 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1960). The Restatement (Second) of Property uses this type of situation as a boundary to
limit restraints on marriage. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2
(1983).
120. See Maddox, 52 Va. (I Gratt.) at 814-15.
121. Maddox was decided in 1854, where there would be more of an "excuse" for
discrimination, while many of the cases that have held discriminatory bequests took place in the
next century and during the Civil Rights Movement. See, e.g., Delaware Trust Co. v. Fitzmaurice,
31 A.2d 383, 389 (Del. Ch. 1943); Turner v. Evans, 106 A. 617, 618 (Md. 1919); Gordon, 124
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reveals the futility in depending on case law to set a hard line in
invalidating discriminatory bequests because many courts have declined
to adopt the Maddox court's reasoning many years later. 122 Of course, it
may not be completely correct to assume that the court made this decision
out of "progress." Instead, other motivations may have a played a role in
the outcome of this case. For example, the judge may have ruled against
the Quaker condition because he believed that it was a heretical religion.
Nevertheless, either of the court's perceptions demonstrates that the
public's fate should not be left up to the biases of individual judges.
Some conditions may be ambiguous and contain some underlying
prejudices. In Turner v. Evans, the bequest included the condition stating:
provided she does not intermarry with the person who is now
paying court to her, it being my intention not to interfere with my
said daughter marrying any person whom I regard as her social
equal, but so far as in my power to prevent her contracting an
23
unsuitable marriage. 1
The court held it was not an invalid testamentary restraint to prohibit
marriage to a certain individual. 124 However, the court did add that
requiring marriage to "someone who is her social equal" is invalid for
indefiniteness. 125 The individual named in this condition is not described
with regard to race, religion, or ethnicity; however, "social equal" may
potentially relate to this sort of identification and not just to a social
class. 126 In any case, the court found the condition vague and not easy to
discern what type of individual would qualify as being her "social
equal."'127 If there were prejudicial connotations in this condition, future
testators can possibly use a vague condition as a tool to implement a
condition that violates public policy. Luckily, whether it intended
to for
28
the right reasons or not, the court invalidated the condition. 1

N.E.2d at 234; In re Silverstein 's Will, 155 N.Y.S.2d at 599-600; In re Lesser's Estate, 287 N.Y.S.
209, 216 (Sur. Ct. 1936); U.S. Nat'l Bank v. Snodgrass, 275 P.2d 860, 864 (Or. 1954); In re Estate
of Keffalas, 233 A.2d 248, 250-51 (Pa. 1967). But see Drace v. Klinedinst, 118 A. 907, 909 (Pa.
1922); In re Devlin's Trust Estate, 130 A. 238, 239 (Pa. 1925).
122. These courts may have limited Maddox to a permissible sphere of eligible partners
inquiry and not adopted the court's position on religious bribery. This limitation makes Maddox
a limitation on marriage case and not one of a discriminatory nature.
123.

Turner, 106 A. at 618.

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id.at 619.
Seeid. at618.
Id.at 619.
See id.
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3. Are These Conditions Unconstitutional?
The Constitution may be the most noticeable avenue in solving this
persistent issue without the need to resort to state legislators or probate
authorities. More specifically, it is logical to point to the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,' 29 the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment, 130 or the right to marry 131 to find a way to invalidate
these unlawful bequests. These three constitutional protections have
safeguarded the public's rights from government intrusion since the
inception of our country. However, constitutional protections are only
implicated when the state or federal government is an actor in the
controversy-not when the dispute is between two private citizens.1 32 But
that does not completely put an end to this discussion. Consider a
situation where the state is tasked with enforcing a private, prejudicial
restraint. The U.S. Supreme Court grappled with this precise issue. 133
The most discussed case dealing in this area is Shelley v. Kraemer.
Here, a party was looking for judicial enforcement of a racially restrictive
covenant. 134 The challenge was that judicial enforcement of racially
restrictive covenants violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 135 The U.S. Supreme Court held that a racially
discriminatory agreement between private individuals did not by itself
violate the Constitution, due to the absence of state action. 136 However,
the enforcement of the restrictive covenant by a state court did constitute
state action, thereby violating the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 37 Thus, the Supreme Court invalidated the
129. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1.
130. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
131. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) ("[O]ur laws and
tradition afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education. ...
Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as
heterosexual persons do."); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and
intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way
of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not
commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as

any involved in our prior decisions.
Id
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948).
Id. at 1.
Id.at 6-7.
Id.at 8.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 19-20.
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138
racially restrictive covenant.
One might reasonably conclude that a discriminatory provision is

effective "only by judicial enforcement by state courts."' 39 In this context,
courts have limited Shelley to its facts. 140 The partial restraint present in
this case was distinguished from conditions which restrain freedom of
religion. 141 In every instance in which the constitutional argument under
Shelley is brought, the courts deny its applicability, usually without much
explanation. 142 The court is viewed as a neutral party that permits the

discriminatory provisions without direct involvement. 143 The Supreme
Court held that state courts cannot enforce a racially restrictive covenant
between willing buyers and sellers. 14 4 It flows logically then that because
will disputes contain adverse parties, the probate courts are permitted to

enforce parallel prejudicial testamentary provisions without implicating
constitutional protections. 145 This questionable reasoning that courts have
hid behind is noticeable, to say the least.
In Shapira v. Union National Bank, the court upheld a provision by
which the testator's son was to receive a share of the bequest "if he is
married at the time of my death to a Jewish girl whose both parents were

Jewish.' ' 146 If the son was not then married to a Jewish woman, the
executor was directed to keep the share for seven years; if marriage to a
Jewish woman had not occurred by the end of the seven-year period, the
executor was instructed to give the share to "The State of Israel.' ' 147 The
court distinguished the provision from Shelley by saying it was not being
138. Id. at 20.
139. See id. at 13.
140. See, e.g., In re Kempf's Will, 297 N.Y.S. 307, 312 (App. Div. 1937); Shapirav. Union
Nat'l Bank, 39 Ohio Misc. 28, 30-31 (Ct. Com. P1. 1974); U.S. Bank of Portland v. Snodgrass,
275 P.2d 860, 863-64 (Or. 1954); In re Estate of Laning, 339 A.2d 520, 526 (Pa. 1975).
141. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 17-18.
142. See, e.g., In re Kempfs Will, 297 N.Y.S. at 312; Shapira, 39 Ohio Misc. at 30-31;
Snodgrass,275 P.2d at 863-64; In re Estate ofLaning, 339 A.2d at 526.
143. See In re Estate of Wilson, 452 N.E.2d 1228, 1236 (N.Y. 1983) (stating that the court's
"neutral regulation of contracts permitting parties to enter discriminatory agreements" did not rise
to state action as seen in Shelley; however it became a state actor through the "exercise of its
judicial power directly effect[ing] a discriminatory act").
144. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 19.
145. Professor Jeffrey Sherman distinguished Shelley from testamentary restraint cases as
follows: In Shelley, the state court was not acting neutrally. A willing buyer and a willing seller
had reached agreement as to the sale of property, but the state court came between them and barred
the sale because the buyer was African-American. In the case of a testamentary religious
condition, in contrast, the state probate court is acting neutrally, simply distributing a decedent's
property according to the decedent's wishes, as a court would do in the case of any decedent. The
discrimination is the testator's, not the court's. Jeffrey G. Sherman, Posthumous Meddling: An
InstrumentalistTheory of TestamentaryRestraintson Conjugaland Religious Choices, 99 U. ILL.
L. REv. 1273, 1316 (1999).
146. Shapira,39 Ohio Misc. at 30-31.
147.

Id.
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asked to enforce any restriction upon the beneficiary's constitutional right
to marry.1 48 Rather, this court stated that it was being asked to enforce the
testator's restriction upon his son's inheritance.1 49 The court did not apply
the permissible sphere of eligible partners test found in Maddox to
invalidate the condition, either.150 The court concluded that the testator's
purpose was not designed to punish his son for not carrying out his
wishes, but for the preservation of the Jewish faith and blood.151 However
unpersuasively, the court honored the testator's intent and decided not to
question the intelligence of the bequest. 15 2 The court's decision indicates
that private racial restraints could be acceptable because the decedent is
not a state actor.15 3 This disturbing implication, like the one in In re
Silverstein 's Will, should not be permitted.
The court in In re Estate of Laning followed the precedent set in
Shapira in following the testator's "true" purpose in making the
condition. 54 The condition required the beneficiaries to be "members in
good standing of the Presbyterian Church.- 155 The court stated that it was
not unconstitutional for the state to grant judicial enforcement to the
condition.' 56 The court regarded the condition not as one calculated to
restrict the legatees' religious choices, but rather as one designed to
further the testator's own religion. 157 The court concluded that the testator
had a "compelling interest" in enforcing the condition because she was
furthering her own free exercise interest in seeking followers to her
faith. 58 The court in this case fashioned the testator's motivation that was
not found in the bequest. The will itself said nothing about the testator
seeking followers, rather than inducing or restricting the beneficiaries to
observe a certain religion. 5 9 Nevertheless,160 the court read a benevolent
motive into the bequest, thus upholding it.
The court in In re Kempf's Will continued the trend of distinguishing
facts in the probate context from Shelley.'61 There, the provision read
"this legacy is made upon condition that said children shall be brought up
148. Id. at 827.
149. Id.
150. Id. at831.
151.

Id. at832.

152. Id.
153. See id at 827-28; see also In re Silverstein's Will, 155 N.Y.S.2d 598, 599 (Sur. Ct.
1956) (making the same racial implications as the Shapiracourt).
154. In re Estate of Laning, 339 A.2d 520, 526 (Pa. 1975).
155. Id. at 521.
156. Id. at 526.
157. Id.; see also Shapira,315 N.E.2d at 832.
158. In re Estate ofLaning, 339 A.2d at 526.
159. Seeid. at521.
160. Id. at 526.
161. In re Kempf's Will, 297 N.Y.S. 307, 312 (App. Div. 1937).
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and educated in the faith of and according to the Roman Catholic
Religion, otherwise this paragraph of this my last will and testament shall
cease and be void and of no effect."' 162 The court held that the
constitutional guarantees of religious freedom are limitations on the
power of government and not on the right of an individual. 163 The testator
had the right to burden his gift with conditions after choosing the
beneficiary as his devisee. 164 Further, the beneficiary had the right to
forego the devise.' 65 The court concluded that the condition was valid and
the beneficiary could not disregard the provision and successfully take
the devise.' 66 In this case, the court distinguished itself from Shelley by
67
stating that constitutionality only applies to government actors.'
Predictably, the court failed to articulate its role in enforcing this
condition and giving force to the prejudice, whereas the Court in Shelley
did not. 1 68 The court in In re Kempf's Will also takes the focus away from
the condition and puts it on the beneficiary's ability to refuse the
devise. 169 This is a simplistic argument in that it does not take into
account what the devise is actually worth. A beneficiary often has an
expectancy to receive a gift and it may not be so easy to turn down.
Beneficiaries should not be required to decide whether to accept a devise
if the underlying condition is for a discriminatory purpose.
Other courts have more vehemently and unashamedly endorsed
discriminatory provisions against Constitutional protections.170 In U.S.
Bank of Portlandv. Snodgrass,the condition read "to my said daughter
Merle... provided she shall have proved conclusively to my trustee and
to its entire satisfaction that she has not embraced, nor become a member
of, the Catholic faith nor ever married to a man of such faith.' 17 ' The
court vigorously defended the testator's condition as follows:
In terms of common parlance, "bigotry" and its concomitant
"intolerance" are ordinarily odious and socially distasteful. They
usually connote some intrusion upon or a variance with our
traditional thoughts on religious liberty and religious tolerance; but
we find nothing in the law declaring religious bigotry or
intolerance to be mala in se. It is not until actions motivated by the
intolerant extremes of bigotry contravene the positive law or
162.

Id.at 309.

163.

Id.at312.

164.

Id.

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948).
See In re Kempfs Will, 297 N.Y.S. at 312.
U.S. Bank of Portland v. Snodgrass, 275 P.2d 860, 863-64 (Or. 1954).
Id. at 862.
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invade the boundaries of established public policy that the law is
quickened to repress such illegal excesses and in proper cases levy
toll upon the offenders
as reparation to those who have been
72
damaged thereby.1
173
The court defended the condition as a matter of free expression.
This case is often cited to defend discriminatory protections against
Constitutional challenges and public policy challenges. 74 It is unclear
whether the court was criticizing the inadequate laws that were already in
place or was joining other courts in certifying discriminatory behavior.
Whether intended to incite an avenue for change or not, the court added,
"[w]hile one may personally and loudly condemn a species of
'intolerance' as socially outrageous, a court on the other hand must guard
against being judicially intolerant of such an 'intolerance', unless the
court can say the act of intolerance is in a form not sanctioned by the
law." 75 This statement gives support for the necessity to create some
form of widespread legislation to quell the continuance of unlawful,
discriminatory will provisions.
Courts have demonstrated their collective inability to harmonize on a
consistent and sound standard when faced with conditional bequests of
discriminatory nature. To some, it may seem understandable that these
types of conditions were permitted earlier in our nation's history, but
these discriminatory conditions are unacceptable today. 176 Instead of
leaving testators' estates at the mercy of the courts' biases and
discretions, states should adopt a probate provision that removes the
uncertainty based on this tenet of society. Without this type of legislation,
courts today will continue to threaten society's evolution and focus on
equality. This very occasion transpired as recently as 2009.117

IV. DISCRIMINATORY

CONDITIONS STILL RIPE TODAY

The cases discussed in Part III mostly occurred from the late 1800s
until a few years after the mid-1970s.' 78 Since then, some states have
passed statutes that disallow all conditions in restraint of marriage, but
these statutes do not adequately address the balance between a testator's
intent and the public policy interests in prohibiting discrimination in
172.
173.

Id.at 863.
Id.at 864.

174.

See, e.g., Shapira v. Union Nat'l Bank, 39 Ohio Misc. at 30; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF

29 (2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS
175. Snodgrass, 275 P.2d at 863 (emphasis added).
176. See supra Part 11.

TRUSTS §

177.

See infra Part IV.

178.

See supra Part III.C.

§§

6.2, 8.1 (1983).
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wills. 179

As a result, precedents that these outdated cases leave behind are
still very much in play when discriminatory bequests are challenged in
court. This exact point was recently exemplified in the recent case In re
Estate of Feinberg.
A descendant of mine other than a child of mine who marries
outside the Jewish faith (unless the spouse of such descendant has
converted or converts within one year of the marriage to the Jewish
faith) and his or her descendants shall be deemed to be deceased
for all purposes of this instrument as of the date of such
marriage. 80
The Illinois Supreme Court upheld this discriminatory bequest. 181
According to the case, the testator was concerned about the potential
extinction of the Jewish people, due to the Holocaust and by gradual
dilution as a result of intermarriage with non-Jews. 182 His intent was to
benefit those descendants who chose to further Judaism by marrying
within the religion. 183 The court stated that the testator had no obligation
to make any provision at all for the grandchildren.184 The court concluded
that the condition was not intended to control their grandchildren
regarding marriage decisions or the practice of Judaism; rather, the devise
rewarded those grandchildren whose lives most closely held the testator's
8 5
values.'
While there is no inherent right to receive property by will, thus
allowing for the imposition of conditions, the conditions should be made
within the confines of public policy. Here, the condition is basically a
strong-arm provision. The provision blatantly restrains the beneficiaries'
freedom of religion and marriage, despite the manner in which the court
construed it. By limiting the beneficiaries' sphere of eligible partners and,
impliedly, their religious preferences, the testator is engaging in
testamentary discrimination. There is no benevolent motive in play here;
the purpose of the condition is to control the beneficiaries' actions to get
them to marry within the testator's preferred faith and convert their
spouses within one year.' 86 No matter which theory the court employs,
179. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 710 (West 2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-6 (2013); IND.
CODE § 29-1-6-3 (2013); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-706 (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-02-25
(2013); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 220 (2013).
180. In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888, 891 (II!. 2009) (citing the original condition
in 891 N.E.2d 549, 550 (111.
App. Ct. 2008)).
181. Id.at 903.
182. Id.at 896.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 895.
185. Id.at 903.
186. See id. at 891.

UNIVERSITY OFFLORIDA JOURNAL OF LA WAND PUBLICPOLICY

[Vol. 25

the beneficiaries are prohibited from receiving a legacy because their
religion is not one the testator would have preferred them to adopt.
Further, if the court wanted to arbitrarily apply the reasonableness test, as
it so often does, then the testator's reasoning could plausibly be judged
as unreasonable for one person to believe that they needed to or even
could save an entire group of people from "extinction."' 187 Nothing is
stopping his future descendants from moving away from the Jewish faith.
The testator's dead hand can only control so much.
This controversial case has created a ready opportunity for legislatures
to take action and continue to strive for equality. Some limitations should
be set to what otherwise must be adhered to as the testator's intent
because these conditional bequests are overstepping the bounds protected
by public policy. As this case continues to garner more and more attention
and commentary and sheds light on a much larger and deeply rooted
to look at the recommended approaches from the
issue, it is important
88
Restatements.'
V. OTHER NOTABLE APPROACHES

A. Restatement (Third)of Trusts
The most recent authority to thoroughly examine the area of bequests
is the Restatement (Third) of Trusts. The relevant provision from this
Restatement is section 29. Section 29 "Purposes and Provisions That Are
Unlawful or Against Public Policy" states "An intended trust or trust
provision is invalid if: (a) its purpose is unlawful or its performance calls
for the commission of a criminal or tortious act; (b) it violates rules
relating to perpetuities; or (c) it is contrary to public policy.'' 189 This
approach essentially bars any conditions placed on bequests by saying
that any testamentary condition that restricts the beneficiary's personal
conduct should not be enforceable.' 90 Although this Restatement
provides several examples to give an idea of what is or is not against
public policy, it does not provide us with a clear definition for which to
judge future cases. 191 In effect, the public policy rationale is overexpansive and completely disregards the testator's wishes.192 Prior to the
formulation of this Restatement, Professor Jeffrey Sherman proposed a
187.

See id. at 893.

188.
189.

See infra Part V.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 (2003) (emphasis added).

190. See id. § 29(c).
191. See id.
192. See generally Sherman, supra note 145, at 1321 (discussing the need to bar all types of
conditions).
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"minimalist testation theory," which would invalidate any type of
testamentary restraint-including the prohibition of benevolent
conditions that society would find beneficial. 193 He contended that
testation should be limited only to the act of choosing beneficiaries and
disposing of one's estate, rather than allowing, in his view, unnecessary
conditioned bequests.' 94 This theory foreshadowed the Restatement's
approach when it was formulated four years later. 195 If courts applied this
rule, it is conceivable that they would reach more consistent results across
the board. However, this complete barring will severely harm testators in
not allowing them to distribute their estate to their liking with any
conditions at all. Its solution removes the entire sphere of conditions from
on the main reasons why the conditions
the equation, rather than focusing
96
1
are undesirable-prejudice.
B. Restatement (Second) ofProperty
The Restatement (Second) of Property contains two relevant
provisions that attempt to address the controversy with discriminatory
bequests. The two provisions are sections 6.2 and 8.1. Section 6.2
"Restraints on Some First Marriages" states
An otherwise effective restriction in a donative transfer designed
to prevent the acquisition or retention of an interest in the event of
some, but not all, first marriages of the transferee is valid if, and
only if, under the circumstances, the restraint does not
unreasonably limit the transferee's opportunity to marry. If the
restriction is invalid, the donative transfer takes effect as though
the restriction had not been imposed. 197
Section 8.1 "Provisions Concerning Religion" states: "An otherwise
effective provision in a donative transfer which is designed to prevent the
acquisition or retention of property on account of adherence to or
rejection of certain religious beliefs or practices on the part of the
transferee is valid."' 198
This approach upholds partial restraints on marriage, unless the beliefs
of the transferee are so contrary to the condition that marriage is unlikely
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 29 (2003).
196. Some states have adopted these approaches into their trust codes. See, e.g., FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 736.0404 (West 2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.7404 (West 2013); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 64.2-722 (2013).
197.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP. § 6.2 (1983).

198.

Id.§ 8.1.
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to ever occur or the number of eligible spouses is slight.199 These two
provisions appear to have influenced the states in their efforts in
attempting to address these types of restraints.20 0 These approaches
address restraints in the marriage context, but ignore other scenarios in
which unlawful restrictions would occur. These sections are also
inadequate because they exhibit the reasonableness test. 01 Subjectivity is
the problem with the reasonableness test-the designation of what is
reasonable may vary from courtroom to courtroom throughout the
country. A case-by-case approach using the reasonableness test cannot
continue to be employed if there is ever going to be fairness and
consistency in this process. The approach based on the number of
available spouses is also futile.2 0 2 For example, "a bequest conditioned
on the legatee's marrying a Jewish person stands more likely to be upheld
in New York than in Wyoming," 20 3 and "a bequest conditioned on the
legatee's marrying a Christian probably could withstand attack
everywhere in the country, while a bequest conditioned on the legatee's
marrying a Taoist probably could not survive anywhere."20 4 Rather than
focusing on the discriminatory terms of the condition themselves, the
condition stands or falls based on the demographics of a particular area.
Under this hypothetical, the beneficiary is left with a large number of
Jewish mates from which to choose, thus allowing the condition to remain
legal, despite the repugnance of the condition.
Like the state statutes in which they influence, these Restatement
provisions are inadequate in pinpointing the issue of discrimination in
will and trust bequests. The provisions are a step in the right direction, as
opposed to much of the case law. 20 5 Still, a sharpening of the language is
required that does not go overbroad in invalidating all conditional
bequests or too narrow in restricting the rule's scope to the marriage
context only.
VI. PROPOSED LEGISLATION

In order to protect society from unfair and prejudicial testamentary
conditions, the Uniform Probate Code should adopt the following
legislation:
199. Seeid.§§6.2,8.1.
200. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 710 (West 2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-6 (2013); IND.
CODE § 29-1-6-3 (2013); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-706 (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-02-25
15, § 220 (2013).
(2013); OKLA. STAT. tit.
201. See supra Part III.C.

202.
203.
204.

Sherman, supra note 145, at 1320.
Id.at 1321.
Id.

205.

See supra Part III.C. 1.
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A testator shall be permitted to make testamentary conditions in
wills and trusts, and deference should generally be granted to the
testator's intent. However, a testator shall not condition bequests
based on race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity,
disability, age, sexual orientation, or marital status. These bequests
restrictions and are void as against
are unlawful 20testamentary
6
public policy.
In effect, this legislation offers protection to groups who have been
traditionally discriminated against, preserves the testator's intent in
situations unrelated to discriminatory purposes (restriction against
specific persons, benevolent purposes, etc.), and creates an exception to
what otherwise should be adhered to as the controlling intent of the
testator. Admittedly, this provision may lend to some abuse if brought as
a non-meritorious claim against an estate. As we have seen, however, the
20 7
notion of suing on the idea of discriminatory bequests is not at all new.
This issue has been repeatedly litigated over the last century and a half.
The importance of eliminating discrimination from a public,
memorialized document like a will far outweighs the possibility of
individuals misapplying the provisions for the wrong reasons. This
provision places the focus on the testator's actions and takes the decision
of complying with the condition out of the beneficiary's hand in this one
instance. Further, it serves the benevolent purpose of making conditions
for lawful and benign reasons. This legislation keeps the testator's intent
intact, but carves out a necessary exception to protect the greater society
from intolerance and discrimination.
VII. CONCLUSION
Proper legislation is required to comprehensively address the extent
to which a testator may condition his devises. As the Snodgrass court
stated, the judiciary cannot prevent intolerable, discriminatory conditions
"unless the court can say the act of intolerance is in aform not sanctioned
by the law., 218 The proposed legislation goes directly to the heart of the
issues present in these discriminatory conditions. While previous
assertions have proven too broad20 9 or too narrow 210 to appropriately deal
with unlawful testamentary provisions, this approach identifies the

206. This is the Author's proposed legislation.
207. See supra Part 11I.C.
208. U.S. Bank of Portland v. Snodgrass, 275 P.2d 860, 863 (Or. 1954) (emphasis added).
209. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 (2003).
210.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP. §§ 6.2, 8.1 (1983).
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problem as rooted in prejudice. 21 No longer is it acceptable for testators
to hide behind the lack of Constitutional safeguards available to
beneficiaries. 212 Over the years, society and the legal system have spoken
to the public policy of protecting individuals, while also endorsing and
nurturing equality. 213 This progressive change cannot only be viewed as
between private citizen and government, but between private citizen and
private citizen as well. Courts, through their individual perceptions of
what is reasonable, can no longer contain this type of spillover. While
this legislation places limits on testators, it does not trample over a
testator's intent. In making conditions, a testator's intent is still preserved
in every way, except in the case of unlawful discriminatory provisions.
This legislation correctly balances the testator's intent while protects
beneficiaries and society at large.

211.
212.
213.

See supra Part V.
See supra Part I1I.D.
See supra Part II.

